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Abstract:  By  means  of  an  extensive  methodological  apparatus  including  analysis  of  chain  base  indexes, 
comparisons, syntheses and case studies, literature review of scientific articles, books or official documents released 
by international organizations and national agencies, viz. World Bank, OECD, Tax Justice Network, U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service, U.S. Government Accountability Office, UK HM Revenue & Customs, Christian Aid, the present 
paper assesses tax havens climate through a consequentialist vs. a deontological moral lens, approach which to our 
knowledge has not been tackled before. Thus, it offers a variety of consequentialist and deontological judgments on 
naysayers and yea-sayers to tax havens climates. Adding a philosopher’s eye to an economist’s view regarding the 
morality of tax havens and appraising main aspects based on unprejudiced multidisciplinary evaluation, this article 
tries to umpire all voices, making the case that the morality of international financial centers is not a resolute one. 
Therefore, it should be discussed, analyzed and understood according to different perspectives of morality and 
parties involved: international bodies, non-tax haven countries and their citizens, tax havens, foreign investors in 
offshore businesses. 
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1.  Introduction 
Man has an innate desire to reach Heaven, but also to experience a heavenly life starting from Earth. One of the 
evidences underlying this propensity is the plethora of worldwide tax havens endorsed by developed polities. For 
how can one enjoy such life in nowadays fickle global market than artfully dodging taxation and ending up spending 
wads of money on earthly whims? In these jurisdictions, located either on remote islands or mainland realms, many 
taxpayers’  concerns  revolve  around  fiscal  obligations,  tax  advisors,  tax  preparers,  thus  being  no  strangers  to 
concepts like “deduction”, “exemption”, “write-off”, “double taxation”, “transfer prices”, “banking secrecy”, “trust 
fund”, “hedge fund” or “mutual fund”. The fast proliferation of tax havens and their highly lucrative financial 
sectors often competing with established economies - despite the small number of residents – have triggered lively 
debates on their morality. Hence, over time many have positioned themselves either on one side of the barricade or 
the other, uttering a spate of trenchant judgments. Some observers have befriended the concept of “tax havens”, 
advocating  for  the  benefits  they  yield,  e.g.,  capital  allocation  and  accumulation,  promotion  of  jurisdictional 
competition, protection of human rights. Others’ viewpoints have run counter to the former arguments, stressing that 
jurisdictions like these hinder social responsibility of corporate taxpayers who are ensnared by advantageous tax 
cuts. In the same vein, international bodies have unleashed quite unbridled points by singling out countries which 
favor harmful tax competition and which threaten the very fairness of tax systems around the world.  
In an endeavor to analyze these contrary opinions, one might question what sort of message tax havens convey 
to  outer  entities.  Is  the  flight  towards  tax  havens  a  “sin”  of  nonpaying  fair  shares  or  a  virtue  of  those  who 
knowledgeably  speculate  opportunities  in  the  most  advantageous  way?  What  sort  of  principles  are  guiding 
international bodies in their quest for mitigating the number of tax havens and, provided organizations ground their 
actions on moral principles, are these principles universally deemed and accepted as moral by all parties concerned? 
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What are the moral boundaries in which an external party can demand changes to a particular tax system, given the 
state sovereignty? How moral are capital flows towards tax havens, judging from the standpoint of the citizens in 
non-tax havens which lose considerable funds? What do foreign investors reckon when choosing tax havens as 
destinations  for  their  wealth?  Last  but  not  least,  should  tax  havens  activities  be  assessed  on  their  underlying 
character per se or on the consequences they generate at a local and regional scale? The present study aims to 
answer all these queries, analyzing tax havens climate through a consequentialist versus a deontological moral lens, 
approach which to our knowledge has not been tackled before. By adding a philosopher’s eye to an economist’s 
view regarding the morality of tax havens and appraising main aspects based on unprejudiced multidisciplinary 
evaluation, this article tries to umpire all voices, making the case that the topic of tax havens morality is not a 
resolute one. Therefore, it should be discussed, analyzed and understood according to different perspectives of the 
morality concept and the parties involved. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 sets forth briefly the matter of tax havens within the framework of 
tax behavior; section 3 outlines the main attributes discerning consequentialism from deontology. Section 4 encloses 
a terse analysis of tax havens’ interaction climate between taxpayers and authorities, by means of consequentialist 
and deontological moral concerns; section 5 comprises a rundown of the chief arguments concerning the morality of 
tax havens.    
 
2.  Tax Havens - Apparently Remote Islands in the Tax Compliance Ocean   
Enjoying the perks of modern societies, afforded as public goods by dint of government spending, comes with a 
price, i.e., taxation. Since the early days of tax compliance research (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Schmölders, 
1959, 1960; Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976; Song and Yarbrough, 1974; Srinivasan, 1973; Vogel, 1974; Yitzhaki, 
1974) [3-31-32-37-38-39-41-42], social scientists have concluded that some dwellers of nowadays communities pay 
the respective price, whereas others fail to do so. Put differently, taxation deals with a Janus-faced phenomenon 
entailing compliance and noncompliance. On the one hand, tax compliance behaviors follow the law both in spirit 
and letter, therefore including voluntary compliance, i.e., willingness to pay taxes out of a moral obligation towards 
a trusted state, and enforced compliance, i.e., paying taxes out of a conviction that authorities hold the power to 
detect  and  sanction  tax  dodging  (Kirchler,  Hoelzl  and  Wahl,  2008)  [21].  On  the  other  hand,  noncompliance 
behaviors  stem  from  disobeying  the  letter  and/or  spirit  of  the  law,  thus  resulting  into  tax  evasion,  i.e.,  illegal 
mitigation of fiscal liabilities by breaking the letter and spirit of tax precepts, or tax avoidance, i.e., legal mitigation 
of fiscal liabilities by breaking the spirit of tax precepts.  
While tax evasion acts are somewhat easier to classify, tax avoidance cases pose more difficulties and require 
extensive analyses. Authorities around the world recognize a taxpayer’s right to use tax reliefs as stated by the law, 
but are opposed to aggressive tax planning via rule bending. Consequently, they might even develop lineups of 
warning signs lest taxpayers fall into the trap of avoidance schemes. The following table captures such list released 
by the British tax authority HM Revenue & Customs: 
 
Table 1. Twelve red flags to ease spotting tax avoidance schemes  
HM Revenue and Customs, UK
 
1.  They sound too good to be true. E.g., Schemes allege to cut tax liabilities with little 
or no real cost, after paying the promoter and signing paperwork. 
2.  Tax gains or returns exceed any advantages granted by real economic activities, 
expenses or investment risks. 
3.  Schemes imply arrangements much too complicated for the purpose of diminishing 
fiscal burden.  
4.  Schemes imply artificial or concocted arrangements.  
5.  Schemes imply money circling back to where they started. 
6.  Scheme promoters either support arrangements with financial resources or involve 
other parties able to do so. 
7.  Offshore companies or trusts are involved despite the lack of any solid commercial 
reason.  
8.  Tax havens or countries approving banking secrecy are involved.  
9.  Schemes comprise exit arrangements aimed at dodging tax consequences.  
10.  Schemes require confidentiality or secrecy. 
11.  In some cases upfront fees must be disbursed, while in other cases arrangements 
stipulate a no win/no fee condition. 
12.  Schemes have been labeled through a Scheme Reference Number (SRN) by the 
HMRC, based on the Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes (DOTAS) regime.    
Source: 
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Adapted after HM Revenue & Customs, Tempted by Tax Avoidance? A Warning for People Thinking about 
Avoidance Schemes (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/avoidance/overview.htm; referred on 23/02/2014) [52]. 
 
Albeit the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion seems clear in theory, practice has unearthed 
several inconsistencies (Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian, 2001: 459) [36]. This is because the increasing level of 
tax law complexity around the world has opened a manifold of loopholes, has given tax practitioners large room for 
interpretations and has blurred boundaries which once looked steady. One might even claim that tax law complexity 
is a fuel which fires noncompliance. As a consequence, what could be framed as avoidance under a particular tax 
law article might be perceived as evasion under a different section of the same law. Considering the thin line 
between legality and illegality in taxation matters, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the only US president elected to serve 
four consecutive terms, distinguished the two concepts in a most original manner: “Tax avoidance means that you 
hire a $250,000-fee lawyer, and he changes the word ‘evasion’ into the word ‘avoidance’” [60].   
If  the  aforementioned  arguments  evince  uncertainty  regarding  the  legal  status  of  tax  affairs,  things  appear 
similar  when  tackling  moral  concerns.  Both  tax  avoidance  and  tax  evasion  acts  generate  the  same  result,  viz. 
mitigation of taxes. Hence, taxpayers generally equate avoidance with evasion, because as scholars like Sandmo 
(2003: 5) [30] assert “the borderline between what seems morally right and wrong does not always coincide with the 
border between what is legal and illegal”. In the same vein, Prebble and Prebble (2012: 744) [29] opine that: 
“Judges are correct when they note that there is a legal dissimilarity between evasion and avoidance, but the factual 
similarities between the two are of much greater moral significance than the legal difference; from the perspective of 
morality we should look at the two phenomena as being just one phenomenon. Public opinion appears to reach the 
same conclusion”.    
Supporters who defend multinational corporations and public figures pilloried by the media for aggressive tax 
avoidance schemes justify noncompliance behavior based on notable representatives of the legal system. In this 
respect,  the  famous  statement  pronounced  by  American  Justice  Learned  Hand  during  the  1934  “Helvering  v. 
Gregory” case proves to be extremely advantageous: “Any one may arrange his affairs so that his taxes shall be as 
low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which best pays the treasury. There is not even a patriotic 
duty to increase one’s taxes” (Ordower, 2010: 47) [26-59-46]. Another assertion from the same judge Hand dating 
back to 1935 (i.e., “Commissionaire v. Newman”) is equally appreciated: “Over and over again courts have said that 
there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everyone does so, rich or 
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced 
extractions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant” (Chirelstein, 1968: 
456) [8]. Not to mention that Scottish judge Lord Clyde (James, 2012: 23) [18] follows a similar rationale: “No man 
in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so to arrange his legal relations to his business or to 
his property so as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest shovel into his stores”.  
Acknowledging the often unclear contours of tax avoidance and evasion, compliance literature has welcomed 
the new concept of “tax avoision” (Seldon, 1979) [34] as a portmanteau derived from “avoidance” and “evasion”, 
which characterizes deportment aiming to curtail fiscal liabilities under a vague tax law (James, 2012: 24) [18]. 
While interacting with taxpayers, tax authorities come across the four behavioral subtypes (i.e., voluntary tax 
compliance, enforced tax compliance, tax avoidance, tax evasion). Depending on the prevalence of such behaviors 
among the vast majority of taxpayers - which ultimately determines the level of budgetary resources - the interaction 
climate  may  be  defined  by  synergism  or  antagonism  (Kirchler,  Hoelzl  and  Wahl,  2008)  [21].  Voluntary  and 
enforced compliance are likely to prevail in a synergistic climate, where the “service and client” approach is the 
golden rule: tax authorities provide high quality services for their clients, whom they treat with respect; taxpayers 
value the respect and reciprocate by complying. Tax avoidance and tax evasion are expected to override compliance 
in an antagonistic climate, where players act according to the “cops and robbers” approach: tax authorities suspect 
all taxpayers of noncompliance, thus favoring high probabilities of audit and harsh penalties; taxpayers search for 
noncompliance  opportunities  out  of  discontent,  thereby  upholding  the  informal  sector.  As  regulators  and  first-
movers  within  the  game  of  tax  compliance,  authorities  have  the  ability  to  choose  a  particular  approach  and 
predispose  the  nature  of  the  interaction  climate.  In  turn,  taxpayers  possess  the  capacity  to  grasp  authorities’ 
intentions and shape the climate, because the interaction between the two parties is a dynamic one.  
Talking about messages sent by authorities, while delving into issues related to fiscal liabilities Barber (2007: 4) 
[5] records Jean Baptiste Colbert’s assertion with respect to the optimum taxation strategy, which he applied in 
XVIIth century France as controller general of finance appointed by King Louis XIV: “The art of taxation consists 
of so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest possible amount of feathers with the least possible amount of 
hissing” [45]. Tax compulsion based on heavy-handed strategies might have worked thoroughly four centuries ago, 
but  it  is  less  likely  to  function  properly  in  a  globalized  market  [48].  Nowadays  the  goose  can  fly  to  other 
jurisdictions if it loses too many feathers in one place, and most of the times these jurisdictions are represented by 
tax havens. 
With reference to the construct of “tax havens”, despite the extensive literature examining it, various questions 
remain unanswered. Furthermore, uncertainties seem to augment rather than clarify, whence the high number of 
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labels  used  to  describe  them,  e.g.,  “international  financial  centers”,  “offshores”,  “offshore  financial  centers” 
(Hampton and Abbott, 1999) [15], “secrecy jurisdictions”, “tax shelters”. The notion itself is extremely relative, 
“very subjective in nature, as ‘one man’s tax haven is another man’s tax system’” (Eicke, 2009: 87) [11].  
As Orlov (2004: 97) [27] mentions, the syntagm “tax haven” apparently dates from 1959. Its original positive 
connotation (i.e., getaway from harsh fiscal pressures of developed countries) has been deteriorating along the years 
and has attained a negative connotation, being associated most often with unjust tax competition, support for tax 
avoiders and evaders, illegal economic activities and ill-gotten revenues. 
The phenomenon is nondescript, consequently there is no standard definition clearly explaining it. The most 
cited attempt belongs to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Economic Development (OECD), which 
through its 1998 Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue report (OECD, 1998: 20) [25] indicates as 
tax havens “countries that are able to finance their public services with no or nominal income taxes and that offer 
themselves  as  places  to  be  used  by  non-residents  to  escape  tax  in  their  country  of  residence”.  Among  the 
characteristics of a tax haven, the literature acknowledges the following: the low (or no) nominal taxes, banking 
secrecy,  shortage  of  transparency  and  information  exchange,  no  considerable  economic  activities  (Henn,  2013; 
OECD, 1998) [16-25]. Moreover, they also implement “ring-fenced” legal and tax systems, meaning that foreign 
investors are granted preferential treatment compared to local investors (NOU, 2009: 9) [24].  
Since the modern boom period of 1960s-1980s, tax havens have come to know all shapes and sizes, levels of 
economic  development,  geographic  positions  or  political  regimes  (Bǎtrâncea,  2014)  [6].  Nevertheless,  the  tax 
havens story dates back more than 2,200 years. In a comprehensive hindsight on the history of taxation (Adams, 
2001: 88-90; 2011) [1-2], “one of the most fascinating tax stories of antiquity” is singled out. The isle of Rhodes 
was home to the Rhodian Empire and to the most important trade point in the Aegean Sea. On the account that all 
commercial roads passed through it, the empire levied a two percent tax on the value of each vessel’s cargo and used 
the money to hinder pirates from roaming their seas. Although being allies of the powerful Rome, Rhodians made 
the strategic mistake of maintaining a neutral position during the war between Rome and Macedonia. By favoring 
tax competition instead of war, Romans took revenge on Rhodians and established a tax-free zone on the isle of 
Delos, which caused a plunging decrease of 85 percent for the Rhodian tax revenues and ultimately brought their 
defeat. Thus, the island of Delos has come to be remembered as the starting point in the history of tax havens.   
Nowadays, tax havens enjoy a happier fate than ancient Rhodes, since estimates indicate that “half of the world 
trade flows through” them [53]. In the following, we show the evolution of the GDP per capita during 1960-2012 for 
several tax havens and the growth rates per decades, in support of the aforementioned estimates. Among the world’s 
extant tax havens, we considered 36 jurisdictions according to Gravelle (2013) [14], which centralizes lists from 
different reports and scientific articles, e.g., OECD, Tax Justice Network, U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
The tax havens took into account were: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, U.S. Virgin Islands (Caribbean/West Indies), Belize, Costa Rica, Panama 
(Central  America),  Hong  Kong  SAR,  Macau  SAR,  Singapore  (Coast  of  East  Asia),  Andorra,  Channel  Islands 
Guernsey  and  Jersey,  Cyprus,  Isle  of  Man,  Ireland,  Liechtenstein,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Monaco,  San  Marino 
(Europe/Mediterranean), Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles (Indian Ocean), Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon (Middle East), 
Bermuda (North Atlantic), Marshall Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu (Pacific, South Pacific), Liberia (West Africa). 
For each decade and the three-year period, we computed the Average GDP per capita in Tax Havens (THAGDP) 
and the World Average GDP per capita (WAGDP). 
 
 
Figure 1. The evolution of Tax Havens Average GDP per capita with respect to 
World Average GDP per capita, 1960-2012 
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Source: Authors’ computation based on World Bank Data (1960-2012). 
 
One can notice that, starting with the second decade, THAGDP has exceeded WAGDP, peaking during the fifth 
decade. Computing chain base indexes for the considered period, we obtained the following tandems of growth rates 
(WAGDP & THAGDP): 147% & 535.61%, 106.21% & 143.60%, 68.25% & 150.67%, 42.83% & 55.25%, 42.06% 
& -8.77%. Analyzing the dynamics of the growth rates, it can be seen that both indicators have registered a positive 
trend, spiking during the second decade, with gaps of 388.61%, 37.39%, 82.42%, 12.42% and -33.29% respectively. 
The outlier is the slight decrease of THAGDP in the period 2010-2012, due to missing data (i.e., GDP per capita) for 
certain tax havens. In a nutshell, these figures bear witness to tax havens’ upsurge and the rapid conversion of some 
jurisdictions from wretchedness to thriving economic environments. 
 
3.  Consequentialists and Deontologists Debating Morality: An Overview 
According  to  different  scholars,  the  system  of  principles  about  rightness  and  wrongness  of  a  demeanor, 
established within a society or group in order to assure a good, correct and happy life, is regarded as morality. 
Morality emanates from the Latin moralitas which derives from the Latin mores denoting habits of conduct, mores. 
Along the historical tides of philosophical ideas, two main paradigms related to morality have been delineated, i.e., 
consequentialism and deontology. The thrust of consequentialism is the morality of good, whereas the thrust of 
deontology is the morality of duty. In terms of consequentialism, assessing the morality of an action is based on the 
value of its consequences: if the overall consequences are positive, the action is considered moral; if they are 
negative, the action is deemed immoral. Put another way, it resembles the English adage “The ends justify the 
means”, according to which as long as an aim engenders morally desired outcomes, any means of attaining it are 
allowed. In terms of deontology, assessing the morality of an action is based on whether the action follows a set of 
values, principles, norms and rules. Unlike consequentialism, deontological morality does not take into account the 
consequences brought about by the action in question. Under the arch of consequentialist morality stand a panoply 
of exponents, whose theories differ according to the type of consequences which matter most: happiness obtained 
through self-control, mental and emotional strength (stoicism: Zeno of Citium, Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius), 
personal pleasure (hedonism: Aristippus, Democritus), stillness and freedom from fear (epicureanism: Epicurus, 
Lucretius),  general  happiness  or  utility  (utilitarianism:  Hobbes,  Helvétius,  Bentham,  Stuart  Mill,  Sidgwick). 
Deontology hosts exponents whose grassroots vision regarding morality relies on the concept of duty and justice: for 
Kant any kind of behavior embedding respect towards duty and law is moral; Adam Smith considers moral a 
behavior which generates sympathy; Bergson and Fichte opine that an action is moral when it is inspired by our 
human nature (Didier, 1991) [10].       
Based on information retrieved from different sources (Blackburn, 1994; Clément, Demonque, Hansen-Løve 
and Kahn, 1994; Didier, 1991) [7-9-10] we designed the following figure to serve as a compass for the ideas 
presented in the subsequent parts of the paper. The end of the present material is far from entering into philosophical 
debates  about  the  appropriateness  of  one  paradigm  or  another.  In  the  following,  we  resort  to  the  frames  of 
consequentialism and deontology as tools for questioning the morality of tax havens.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THRUST:  
GOOD 
THRUST:  
DUTY  
 
EXPONENTS:  
Stoics, Hedonists, Epicureans, 
Utilitarians (Hobbes, Helvétius, 
Bentham, Stuart Mill, Sidgwick) 
MORALITY PARADIGMS 
DEONTOLOGY  CONSEQUENTIALISM 
The Nature of Behavior 
 
The Nature of Behavior’s Consequences 
 
EXPONENTS:  
Kant, Fichte, Bergson 
THRUST: 
GOOD 
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Figure 2. Features of the Deontological and Consequentialist Paradigms 
                                                  Source: Authors’ perspective. 
 
For a more comprehensive approach, it is expedient to give a couple of examples. Sacrificing two peoples’ lives 
for the sake of rescuing other five is immoral from a deontological standpoint, as the act of killing is deemed wrong; 
from consequentialist viewpoint it is moral, as the positive consequence, i.e., five lives saved outweighs the negative 
one, i.e., two lives lost. A similar line of reasoning applies to what is defined in game theory as the volunteer’s 
dilemma: someone is called to sacrifice her payoffs in order to save other players’ payoffs. Likewise, in the realm of 
finance,  levying  taxes  from  ill-gotten  revenues  is  seen  immoral  from  a  deontological  perspective  because  it 
encourages knavery and fuels underground economy; from a consequentialist outlook this action is considered moral 
because it increases public funds.           
 
4.  Consequentialist and Deontological Judgments on Naysayers and Yea-sayers to Tax 
Havens  
  “The government can’t collect legal taxes from illegal money”, reportedly said the notorious gangster Alphonse 
Gabriel “Al” Capone who built most of his wealth by running a huge illegal network of speakeasies during the 
American Prohibition era [43-51]. As evidence that he was wrong, the U.S. Supreme Court convicted him in 1931 
on three counts of tax evasion (i.e., committed during 1925-1929) and one count of not filing a tax return (i.e., 
committed in 1924) [57]. The tax law can thus be applied irrespective of the legal status of the income source. For 
that matter, in today’s USA, the same as in the 1930s, taxpayers are required by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
to declare all income, obtained either by following or breaking the law: “Income from illegal activities, such as 
money from dealing drugs, must be included in your income on Form 1040, line 21, or on Schedule C or Schedule 
C-EZ (Form 1040) if from self-employment activity” [55-58]. Analyzing the aforementioned requirements, the next 
query arises: How moral is for a government to levy taxes on incomes obtained by taxpayers breaking the letter of 
the law?    
  The following section covers similar rationales, giving voice to both supporters and opponents of tax havens 
through the lens of consequentialist and deontological morality.  
   
4.1. Naysayers: International Organizations, Non-Tax Havens and Their Citizens 
A particular reason for which tax havens have landed on international agendas is their active role in easily 
registering offshore entities (e.g., special purpose vehicles or SPVs) which are said to have caused several economic 
downturns, i.e., East Asia crisis, dot com bubble, the 2008 financial meltdown (Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 
2010: 163) [28]. One of the harshest opponents of tax havens is the OECD, which “seeks to safeguard and promote 
an open, multilateral trading system and to encourage adjustments to that system to take into account the changing 
nature of international trade, including the interface between trade, investment and taxation” (OECD, 1998: 9) [25]. 
From  a  deontological  standpoint,  the  organization  targets  such  jurisdictions  because  they  undermine  fair  tax 
competition at global level. Consequentialist morality also calls for action against tax havens because they impose 
negative externalities on foreign tax systems. Having these two paradigms in mind, through strategies of “naming 
and shaming” (e.g., blacklisting countries as “tax havens” and “uncooperative tax havens”) and “peer pressure”, 
OECD  determined  several  tax  havens  to  renounce  banking  secrecy  and  implement  more  transparent  financial 
regulations.       
  Tax noncompliance situations often bring to discussion the question of government accountability. Whether we 
are talking about moral accountability (i.e., stemming from education) or procedural accountability (i.e., grounded 
on mechanisms restricting power through fundamental principles stated in constitutions), the concept denotes the 
idea according to which “the rulers believe that they are responsible to the people they govern and put the people’s 
interests above their own” (Fukuyama, 2011: 321) [13]. As main providers of public goods and services financed 
through taxation, governments of non-tax haven countries are thus responsible for closing loopholes and detecting 
taxpayers who bend or break the tax law.  
  From  the  consequentialist  perspective,  offshore  centers  are  considered  immoral  by  the  non-tax  haven 
governments since offshores impose negative consequences on their tax systems (NOU, 2009; OECD, 1998) [24-
25]. Drawn by very low (or none) fiscal burdens and other financial incentives, several taxpayers from non-tax 
haven countries end up changing residence or even citizenship. This happens usually in developed countries, which 
finance public goods via high taxation levels and have few options to counterbalance tax competition. A first option 
is lowering taxation levels. Although desirable, a significant decrease in taxation is not a viable solution for it 
seriously affects the quality of public goods to which citizens got accustomed. Hence, when facing diminishing 
budgetary revenues, these governments often levy taxes which are more difficult to avoid/evade (e.g., consumption 
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taxes, sales taxes) and design strategies to deter noncompliance. A second option in the attempt to lessen high fiscal 
pressure is the enactment of double taxation treatises. As third option, governments may decree tax holidays or 
amnesties, though the latter were showed to have startling negative implications on long-term levels of tax morale 
(Torgler, Schaltegger and Schaffner, 2003) [40]. In the case of developing countries, the problem is even more 
serious: the loss of revenues shifting towards tax havens hinders economic development and increases the gap 
between them and industrialized countries.         
  There is also the question of tax morality per se implied by deontology, which governments from non-tax 
havens try to tackle. British Prime Minister David Cameron called tax avoidance schemes as “morally wrong” [54], 
sustaining the campaign initiated by HM Revenue & Customs against such financial plots (see section 2). Being the 
only industrialized country to levy taxes on worldwide income (i.e., “citizenship-based taxation”) [50], the U.S. 
follows the international trend of mitigating noncompliance involving tax havens. Through provisions of the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) enacted on March 18, 2010, the U.S. government aims to clamp down on 
noncompliance acts carried out by U.S. taxpayers holding foreign accounts. As stated on the IRS website, FATCA 
provisions concentrate on reporting: 1) “by U.S. taxpayers about certain foreign financial accounts and offshore 
assets; 2) by foreign financial institutions about financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers or foreign entities in 
which  U.S.  taxpayers  hold  a  substantial  ownership  interest”  [56].  Namely,  foreign  financial  institutions  are 
requested to collaborate with the IRS in disclosing information on income and interest accrued by accounts of their 
American clients. In case of non-reporting, these institutions are subject to a 30% withholding applied to particular 
“dividends, interest, or proceeds from the sale of assets they or their customers receive from the U.S. sources” [44].   
Having seen where international bodies and governments stand on the question of tax havens morality, one 
cannot help wondering what the “vox populi” says with respect to tax noncompliance. The majority of non-tax 
haven citizens are against tax avoidance and tax evasion, which are perceived as immoral in terms of deontology. 
For example, a 2012 survey commissioned by Christian Aid organization revealed that 56% of British taxpayers 
deemed tax avoidance to be “morally wrong” and half demanded to be declared illegal by the tax law [49-61]. 
Citizens often urge governments to close loopholes, implement transparent tax laws, demand social responsibility 
from multinational companies frequently exposed in the media for accomplishing tax purposes by using offshores. 
On various occasions when the media signals flagrant cases of tax avoidance schemes, citizens express discontent 
by boycotting products and services of certain multinationals [63]. In terms of consequentialism, citizens oppose tax 
havens on the ground that they facilitate noncompliance schemes which deprive state budgets of important revenues, 
lessen the quality of public goods and trigger huge fiscal burdens via indirect taxation.    
 
4.2. Yea-sayers: Tax Havens and Foreign Investors 
  Tax haven governments endorse strategies of attracting foreign capital flows via low taxation because, from a 
deontological standpoint, they are morally responsible for their citizens’ wellbeing. Numerous jurisdictions located 
in remote areas, often away from mainland, benefit from scarce natural and human resources, thus need to identify 
efficient  ways  of  boosting  local  economy.  Granting  tax  reliefs  generates  positive  consequences  and  a  win-win 
situation for all parties involved: governments use international exposure to sustain local economic growth and 
attract more foreign investors, citizens benefit from job creation and business opportunities, foreign investors reach 
targeted profit, neighboring countries benefit from the economic activity in the region. Moreover, consequentialist 
supporters of tax havens often argue offshores play a key role on the global market by exercising pressure on foreign 
governments to mitigate taxation and heavy bureaucracy, by protecting human rights and fostering economic growth 
(Johns and Le Marchant, 1993; Mitchell, 2006) [19-22]. Over time, tax havens have proven the efficiency of their 
strategies by concentrating 30% of the global foreign direct investments, 50% of international banking lending and 
52% of global hedge fund industry (Palan et al., 2010: 5-6) [28]. Furthermore, since the 1960s tax haven industry 
boom,  their  average  GDP  per  capita  skyrocketed  compared  to  the  world  average  (see  section  2).  Another 
deontological argument for the existence of tax havens is state sovereignity, which theoretically is indisputable and 
should be respected accordingly. Any jurisdiction, including tax havens, has the right to design and implement its 
own fiscal strategies, which best suit country goals. Tax havens often accuse foreign countries of peer-pressure, 
discrimination and preferential treatment of developed countries on their expense, because as Orwell’s famous quote 
states “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”. In this respect, the OECD is often 
blamed by tax havens of exceeding its original mission and imposing regulations on non-members with no moral or 
legal right (Mitchell, 2006) [22]. Due to the extensive negative exposure through media coverage and blacklisting 
which ultimately affected their credibility, such jurisdictions discard the “tax haven” moniker, perceiving it as 
discriminatory and requesting to be named “international financial centers”. 
  Taking advantage of the opportunities created by the globalized economy, many foreign investors in tax havens 
seem to have followed ad litteram five golden rules given by Warren Buffett, the “Wizard of Omaha”. Hence: 1) if 
focused on success, “you do things when the opportunities come along”; 2) in terms of savings, “do not save what is 
left after spending, but spend what is left after saving”; 3) when deciding about a new investment, “do not put all 
your eggs in one basket”; 4) balance when developing an efficient spending strategy, because “if you buy things you 
do not need, soon you will have to sell things you need”; 5) in leveraging risk, “never test the depth of river with 
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both  the  feet”  (Schroeder,  2009) [33]. Concerning the first two Buffett precepts, when opportunities arise and 
adequate  funds  are  available,  investors  usually  have  two  options:  swim  against  the  tide  and  benefit  from  the 
opportunity; go with the majority flow and miss once-in-a-lifetime-chance. According to estimates (Palan et al., 
2010: 5-6) [28], two million international investors (e.g., businesses, captive insurance companies, various types of 
funds) enjoy tax havens fiscal incentives. Regarding the last three precepts, there is an extensive industry of tax 
advisors, tax consultants, tax  preparers, chartered tax accountants willing to give advice for certain fees. With 
professional assistance, investors spread their activities in different jurisdictions based on thoroughly developed 
leverage strategies.                
From a deontological standpoint, foreign investors believe they act morally on the grounds that freedom of 
movement and capital is a basic human right, if exercised within the boundaries of the law. They are fully entitled to 
choose a market for their investments and to protect the interests of their shareholders, especially when tax havens 
offer more fiscal reliefs than the country of origin. Not to mention that investors can safeguard capital if targeted by 
authoritarian regimes (Mitchell, 2006: 19) [22]. From a consequentialist perspective, investing in tax havens yields 
positive effects for the local markets, translated into economic growth, job creation, development of the real estate 
and service sectors.          
 
5.  Rundown on the Morality of Tax Havens 
Predicated on various methodological procedures, e.g., analysis of chain base indexes, comparisons, syntheses 
and  case  studies,  literature  review  of  scientific  articles,  books  or  official  documents  released  by  international 
organizations  and  national  agencies,  namely  World  Bank,  OECD,  Tax  Justice  Network,  U.S.  Government 
Accountability  Office,  U.S.  Internal  Revenue  Service,  UK  HM  Revenue  &  Customs,  Christian  Aid, this  study 
assesses the morality of tax havens climates based on a consequentialist versus a deontological outlook. Thus, it 
offers an array of consequentialist and deontological judgments on naysayers and yea-sayers to tax havens climates. 
On the naysayer side, international organizations, non-tax haven countries and their citizens perceive offshore 
centers as immoral on grounds of yielding several financial crises, imposing negative externalities on foreign tax 
systems, undermining fair global tax competition, hindering economic growth for developing countries, encouraging 
social  irresponsibility.  On  the  yea-sayer  side,  tax  havens  and  foreign  investors  argue  their  cause  based  on 
responsibility  towards  citizens,  willingness  to  boost  economic  growth  and  citizen  wellbeing,  human  rights 
protection, state sovereignity, freedom of movement and capital.        
Being as much a philosophical query as it is an economic one, evaluating the morality of tax havens leaves 
room for financial analyses and evidence-based conclusions. Using country data spanning 1960-2012 provided by 
the World Bank, we examined the evolution of the GDP per capita for 36 tax havens (as indicated by Gravelle, 
2013) [14] through chain base indexes. After computing average GDP values and growth rates, it could be noticed 
that the evolution of average GDP per capita in tax havens compared to world average GDP per capita avers the 
upsurge of tax haven businesses and the swift turn of some jurisdictions from serious socio-economic straits to 
highly developed financial centers. 
In a time when the rightness or wrongness of tax havens activities is hard to resolutely establish and when 
the consequences of such activities for local/regional socio-economic environments have never been so ticklish to 
evaluate, the risk of positioning oneself on either side of the morality barricade must be avoided. A birds’ eye view 
on all the pros and cons regarding tax havens morality, through the consequentialist and deontological paradigms, is 
not only “a should” but also “a must”, lest one fall into the trap of being too accusative or too permissive, thus adopt 
too harsh measures of punishment or too incongruous policies of support. 
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